

THE US WAR ON TERRORISM – CHAPTER 10

PROFESSOR AND MRS. LUTZ

(Abstract: Definition of terrorism, Anti-terrorism policy making in the US, three principles in fighting terrorism, prevalence of terrorism, causes of terrorism: frustration with the political process, globalization (westernization), weak (or failed) states).

MS LUTZ: Let's start with the definition of terrorism; we'll do the types and we'll talk a little about Iraq and the US involvement there and then Jim (Professor James Lutz) will talk a little bit about terrorism and policy making which can get long and involved. We'll touch on causes and then just a quick conclusion.

The definition of terrorism has six parts: It involves political objectives and goals; it relies on violence or the threat of violence; it's designed to affect a target audience beyond the immediate victim; it involves organization; it involves a non-state actor as a perpetrator, the target or even both; and it's used by a relatively weak actor or group in an attempt to gain influence for their organization. An important note would be that all violence is not terrorism.

PROF LUTZ: While most everybody is familiar with international terrorism, the United States has had anti-abortion extremists in the United States, thus religious terrorists exist inside our country. We had a very weak left wing movement in the 70's and the 80's called "the Weathermen" which never achieved anything like the prominence of the Red Brigades in Italy. Right wing groups in the United States are more prominent. There's a lot of racist and anti-foreign activity and reactions to foreign ideas that hurt the United States. No nationalists other than some Puerto Rico flare ups now and again.

In terms of anti-terrorism policymaking, the Presidency is clearly the dominant area for dealing with terrorism strategy. While Congress has been supportive, Congress is less involved in setting policy. The President has more freedom of action in terrorism policy in part because terrorism by its very nature requires immediate response. Also, there are coordination problems between the CIA and FBI and Homeland Security. The CIA and FBI don't necessarily talk to each other. The CIA is for foreign activities; it's officially prohibited from operating on the soil of the United States. The FBI is primarily domestic with some foreign concerns. Homeland Security is designed to protect within the country so it overlaps more with the FBI with - supposedly - access to intelligence from the CIA. The CIA is not known for sharing information well, though, and neither is the FBI in part because of their antiquated computer systems which doesn't permit them to share. So there's coordination problems that have hindered what the United States have done.

Another issue is civil liberties which come up in the war against terrorism because democracies first have to catch terrorists and there are limitations in what you can use to catch people in democracies. Once you catch them, you have to prove their crimes in a court of law which is tough in a democracy. Knowing something and proving it are two different things, especially where police powers are limited. In the United States those limits are greater. Americans are less likely to respond well to surveillance, for example. Most parts of Europe are more willing to allow surveillance as in the London transportation bombings. The fact that you had cameras everywhere didn't seem to bother anybody. There are lots of Americans that are really uncertain about that idea.

Parts of the US Patriot Act have raised concerns of infringements upon civil liberties, especially powers to search without a warrant and without informing the suspect that they can be searched. Guantanamo Bay and the prisons in Iraq also raise questions of civil liberties for many. I should point out that Guantanamo Bay is not US soil; it is leased in perpetuity or

until we want to give it back to the Government of Cuba which needless to say will not be anytime soon. Since it is not US soil, and we are not dealing with US citizens, the constitutional protections that would normally be in place are not. The reason for choosing Guantanamo Bay wasn't just its isolation. There was also a very real civil liberties component or non component if you will involved in that choice. American courts are increasingly involved in terrorism and civil rights of Americans, and some of their decisions will be pro administration and some will not.

How do you fight terrorism? In a general sense, there are probably 3 perspectives on how to deal with terrorism. One is to treat it as a crime, which is basically the US perspective. Prior to 9/11 terrorists were treated as criminals, because existing law covered the criminal aspects of virtually any terrorist act. The first World Trade Center attack was dealt with as a crime, for example. The perpetrators were imprisoned for trying to blow up a building and they killed people so the law was sufficient to deal with that.

Post since September 11,th the approach has been less criminal act and more act of war. Using the war analogy means you deal with groups and you defeat the groups and you eliminate the groups if need be. Criminal law focuses on such crimes reactively. You wait for the terrorists to strike. Warfare, of course, is all about pre-empting what the other side is doing. The war analogy presupposes an eventual end to it. In the crime analogy, no police force in the world is ever going to tell you that they are going to win the war on crime and eliminate it completely. Some might say that the same is true ultimately about terrorism: you can limit it but you can't defeat it.

The third perspective, one that is not the United States' first choice is to consider terrorism as a disease which means you deal with the symptoms, whether these prescriptions involve reforms or concessions even to those on the other side - that you attempt to treat the causes of terrorism. You must ask: "What is driving the terrorist to violence?" That approach doesn't always work, of course, because some of the things that the terrorists demand you can't concede. Right wing terrorists in the United States want to drive out certain groups that they don't like; if you get rid of these groups then they'll stop the terrorism. Clearly, that is not acceptable.

Contrary to the current administration, I would suggest that Iraq was never a major terrorist threat. The Iraqis were reasonably good at hunting down dissidents in Europe and eliminating them either through their own intelligence operatives or through other mechanisms they managed to eliminate dissidents. Their efforts in the broader sense were not particularly successful. Channelling funds to the PLO and the Palestinian groups they were no different than any other country in the Middle East Arab country in the Middle East in that regard. Obviously, weapons of mass destruction would have changed that.

The London and Madrid bombings were in reaction to events outside of those countries, but the groups opposed to the United States presence in Iraq are more opposed to the United States in general and some of those activities would have occurred anyhow. The Madrid bombing was probably a direct response to the Spanish presence in Iraq, whereas the United States and even Great Britain would have been targets anyhow for groups that are opposed to westernization not just Americanization.

Prevalence of terrorism. The trend in terrorism has always been sensitive to spectacular events and major attacks. 1998 is high because of the bombings of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania Dar es Salaam, 2001 is noteworthy because of 9/11. Thus, major attacks tend to make statistics a little trickier to interpret because any one major attack - and Al-Qaeda tends to mount them infrequently - can skew the statistics. That makes it harder to identify trends. But there does not seem to be a downward trend since 2001 or since the invasion of Iraq.

Causes of terrorism. There is no one cause of terrorism, which means there is no one solution which means there is no one effective counter terrorism technique. Terrorism is a complex problem. But certain things contribute to frustration levels, including frustration. When you can't bring change about through any other means, you use violence. Why can't you bring the change about? A multitude of reasons. Change depends on the government, it depends on the economic circumstances, it depends on public opinion.

Far right wing extremists in the United States are pretty much relegated to the margins by their views. But it is their frustration because they are a small, small minority in the United States and they are never going to be able to accomplish what they think is necessary no matter how strongly they feel about it. I would point out here that not all groups that are frustrated resort to terrorism or violence in any form. To note that frustration is a cause doesn't help us much because we have trouble distinguishing between all these frustrated groups; why do certain ones resort to violence and others don't?

Globalization and the reaction to outside influences. Muslims in the Middle East are reacting to westernization symbolised by the United States. But they aren't only opposed to the United States; they are opposed to westernization. The attack on Bali tourist resorts in 2002, for example, was more than a missed attack against Americans. As symbols of westernization, the tourists were a very appropriate target for the terrorists. Likewise, the right wing in the United States and Europe are reacting to globalization. The anti-immigrant movement in Europe is a reaction against globalization's increased migration.

Finally, weak states. Weak states present opportunities for terrorists either to operate against their governments or to operate from that state against others. Lebanon for 15 years was a haven for all kinds of groups, for example, because it had virtually no government and it was convenient to targets in the Middle East, including Israel. Yemen in the Middle East is home to many groups because the Yemeni Government is a relatively weak government. Iraq, you can argue, has become a weaker state, perhaps more prone to terrorist generation.

In conclusion, it seems clear that terrorism will continue into the future. It will not be eliminated either directly against the United States or against others at least in part because terrorism has worked in the past and counter measures aren't always effective. The United States and other countries will have to continue to create policies to deal with terrorists whomever they may be.

Question and answer session, part one

QUESTION: What lesson is the US giving to the world in particular to weaker states in relation to selective application of civil rights in such things as detaining people in Guantanamo without trial, etc.

PROF LUTZ: First you have to know that the United States has had selective application of civil rights for citizens and non citizen in other areas as well. This is a more extreme case, but the one area where civil rights in the United States were always the weakest was in immigration and naturalisation. Illegal immigrants have fewer judicial safeguards and always have than residents of the United States. So there has always been a selective application and one of the reasons that the selective application in Guantanamo was able to work as quickly as it did is because of this fact.

In fact, foreign nationals have always had fewer civil rights under international conventions than residents. This is not unusual. It is only unusual in the sense of the United States being involved. The United States dealt with foreign nationals during World War II differently and so did every country involved in World War II. I think part of it is methodology of the United States treating everyone equally whereas in times of stress foreign nationals sometimes haven't been treated as well. And remember, the courts are still dealing

with this so the ultimate message that the United States may send may be a positive one if the courts come down on the side of the people that are detained.

Ultimately, it would be nice to send a better message but I think probably the worst message is our utilisation of sending prisoners from Iraq to countries where they can be tortured so our hands are clean. Here we are not violating anyone's civil rights directly but we are obviously are complicit in doing so. I think that is probably a worse message then Guantanamo Bay, not that Guantanamo Bay is a great one.

QUESTION: The Secretary of Homeland Security was appointed immediately after September 11.th Has it been an effective response?

PROF LUTZ: I think the effort to centralize authority has in the short term been marginally more effective then all the independent agencies would have been without any kind of central direction. I say in the short term marginally because any kind of major reorganization was a major reorganization bringing things together from 15 different areas. In the short term there will be severe problems in getting that organized. I think that showed up with FEMA¹ which is now part of Homeland Security. Its reaction to the hurricane disasters left much to be desired.

While in the short term you're not going have an immense improvement because you've got to create a new agency, in the long term it will probably be more effective.

QUESTION: Do Americans realize that part of the reason terrorists have attacked it is because if its foreign policy in the Middle East especially where oil and Israel are concerned?

PROF LUTZ: Regarding Israel, groups in the Middle East like Al Qaeda were unhappy with their fellow Middle Easterners like Egypt for making peace with Israel. Osama Bin Laden isn't that concerned about Israel; it's a minor concern. It assumed greater publicity because it was useful, but his concern with Israel was marginal compared to his concern about Saudi Arabia and westernization in general. In addition, there were also complaints because the United States and Western Europe didn't act quickly enough in Bosnia.

In Bosnia we were supposed to intervene. In other parts of the world we are not suppose to intervene. We are stuck with we'll be "dammed if you do and dammed if you don't." Somebody is going to be unhappy because of what we do and the other side will be unhappy with what we don't do. The United States cannot avoid this. When both of those sides are violent prone, one of them is going to launch terrorist attacks. We can't please the world because the world is unpleasable.

I find the argument about "Why don't we just buy oil instead of invading countries that have it" is indirectly important but not the importance that the question implied. Would we have liberated Kuwait if it didn't have petroleum? Maybe not. Would Saddam Hussein have invaded Kuwait if it didn't have petroleum? No. If it just had been a patch of sand he could have cared less. It is because Kuwait had petroleum that made it important to him which made it important to others.

What made Saddam Hussein more dangerous in the eyes of the administration was the fact that Iraq was a rich country and it had resources that it could use. We are much less concerned about Haiti, not because Haiti doesn't have petroleum but because Haiti can't do much. Haiti is not a threat partially because it is poor. Iraq was more of a threat not just in the eyes of the administration but also a threat to people around it in Iran and Kuwait. So petroleum is a factor but are we there to control the petroleum? no.

¹ The US Federal Emergency Management Agency.

I know lots of people perceive the Iraq invasion as an effort from the United States to control the global petroleum market, but of course our primary source of foreign petroleum is Canada and we don't seem to have used much force there since about 1814.

QUESTION: Can we learn some lessons from how South Africa and the South African governments dealt with the issue of terrorism? During the Cold War era, the South African government which was already very conservative used the so-called "communist bogeyman" to adopt the most stringent legislation and regulations to repress and contain what they defined as a terrorist "onslaught." In the end, it was negotiation among the parties that led to the solution.

PROF LUTZ: I think South Africa is something of a unique case because as you point out it was repression against the majority. In many cases the groups defined as terrorists rightly or wrongly are minority groups.

I think the other important part of that context in one sense is how long it took to rectify the situation. Obviously the South African government labelled people "communist" because that held off the opposition from the United States and the Western Europe for a long period of time. It might have come sooner except they were fighting communists rather than the people.

The South African negotiated approach might work to some extent in Northern Ireland which is a case that it is more similar to the South African experience. I can't see it working at the present time in Iraq because clearly the current Iraqi regime even with American support wouldn't qualify as repressive in quite the same ways South Africa did. It might even represent a majority or at least represent the potential majority.

QUESTION: Is this a war on Terrorism or a war against Islam?

PROF LUTZ: The United States doesn't regard it as a war on Islam but the nature of the persons targeting the United States are largely Muslim and so the United States doesn't focus on the Tamil Tigers in Sri-Lanka because the Tamil Tigers are not directly focusing on the United States. The United States doesn't focus on the right wing violence in Europe against outside groups because they are not targeting the United States. Part of it is simply it is a reactive policy.

The United States has lost a propaganda war. It has been turned into the "United States attacking Islam" as opposed to the "United States attacking Islamic terrorists" and there is of course a world of difference between the two. In 1995, there was the Oklahoma City bombing. We weren't focusing on Muslims at all. We were focusing on the right wing in the United States and the threat that represents because that was the most recent event that happened in the United States. Basically we react to the greatest threat which is not atypical for governments. Now there are groups in the United States that see it as a war between us and them with us being the good guys and them being Muslims. These groups haven't helped. President Bush has gone out of his way to indicate it is not that way. It is hard to distinguish because most of the people that American troops are shooting at are Muslims yes but it is not a war on Islam although it can be portrayed that way very effectively.

QUESTION: I just wanted to know about your opinion on the use of language in the war on terror. The people that are being held in Guantanamo Bay are not referred to as prisoners of war they are referred to as something else. The invasion of Iraq was not referred to as a war it was referred to as maybe a foreign intervention.

PROF LUTZ: Let me do the last one first. The reason for calling them enemy combatants rather than prisoners of war is a judicial one. The minute the United States government calls them prisoners of war the Geneva Conventions and other things apply.

"State supported terrorism" is not the weapon of the week. The United States and the Soviet Union went at each other with whatever mechanisms that would work including supporting violent groups inside, allies of the other, including terrorists by whatever

definition the Contras in Nicaragua will qualify. We supplied, we aided them. We consider that to be state supported terrorism. It is terrorism not because of what the United States was doing but because of what the Contras were doing. The Contras existed. They were not an invention of the United States.

Likewise, the Soviet Union used groups around the world. They didn't invent them. They didn't create them. They provided them with arms and money because it was useful for the Soviet Union to do so. That when we deal with that and this is just the way in which we do on our own work we deal with those terrorist groups and we acknowledge that they receive outside support.

That is not "state led" that is "state supported."

It is important to know the distinction. Not all violence that occurs is terrorism. States do lots of things that are not terrorism. That includes atrocities or massacres or war crimes. If everything becomes terrorism then nothing becomes terrorism. If everything becomes genocide nothing qualifies. Genocide is another term that is over used. Rwanda was genocide. The intent was elimination. It was not terrorism. Not by our definition but not by most conventional definitions either.

"State led terrorism" is different. In Stalin's Russia and Hitler's Germany and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, state repression becomes so violent and so unpredictable that it can constitute terrorism but those are extreme cases of government applying terrorism as opposed to repression.

Repression is different from terrorism because in repression you can avoid being arrested if you know what not to do. You don't criticise the government, you are safe. That may not be a very good life but it is repression. If you can be arbitrary arrested and executed then that is terrorism and ultimately in Nazi Germany in Stalin's Russia and Saddam Hussein there is a lot of the arbitrary in terms of who were eliminated so that might qualify as "state led" terrorism.

QUESTION: Has the War on Terrorism weakened the role of international law?

PROF LUTZ: I would say yes. I don't think there is much doubt about that.

Guantanamo Bay no matter how legalistic you make it has weakened the support for the idea of treating people in effect as prisoners of war even if they don't have that title. For those who understand international law they understand the legalisms involved in the United States but they also understand that since international establishing norms and principles that you weaken those norms and principles by that action no doubt.

QUESTION: In Zimbabwe we have a saying that if someone is hunting for a rabbit then you see the rabbit and the rabbit is hiding behind a small bush. It is allowed and in order to hit the bush and the rabbit. How best can terrorism be fought with minimal damage on innocent communities so as to win the war of perception?

PROF LUTZ: There is recognition from academics that sometimes the government reaction creates more terrorists than it catches. Some terrorist groups try to get the government to overreact, to come in with a heavy hand. They might catch a few terrorists, but they alienate a large segment of the population which actually generates more support for the terrorist. Guerrilla movements use the same tactic because it works.

The problem from a government perspective is going in with a heavy hand sometimes works. And governments almost always try to do what worked the last time because it is always easier to do what you did before than to try and come up with a new way of doing things.

Obviously the IRA did well in generating more support for the IRA within the catholic community in Northern Ireland as time went by. The British troops were of course outsiders and the local police were heavily protestant. That meant neither side was much in

tune with the catholic community. Ideally, you have to be very careful about how you hunt terrorists. You have to be very careful about the bush and make sure you only get the rabbit.

QUESTION: When will America stop being a hypocritical policeman in the world and chop and change its definitions of international law and invasion versus democracy and peace to suit its own agenda? You say you want to eradicate opium in Afghanistan, but you have suspended that operation there while you control the country.

PROF LUTZ: Well I think the use of terminology is important. Yes justice lies in the eye of the beholder. But this is actually exactly what I said earlier: we are being damned for not doing something about the poppy fields in Afghanistan. Something we are not doing is wrong. But in part this reflects the interest of the current Afghan government, not our interest but their interest, in terms of to go in there and eradicate the poppy would make it very difficult for the present regime to gain support. So either we listen to the local regime or we don't listen to the local regime. If we listen to the local regime and don't go in we are being hypocritical. If we do go in we are invading again.

South African Reflection by UP Professor Michael Hough, Director of the Institute for Security Studies.

PROF HOUGH: My goal is to make a few general comments on the presentation and some of the questions that followed, and then draw some similarities and differences between the US and the South African approaches to the "combating of tyranny."

First of all, the problem of reacting to a deed of terror is actually not an easily solved one. Terrorists, after all, want you to over react. Why, after all, did Bin Laden knowingly run the risk of having the Taliban government overthrown? The argument is that, although the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq have been consequences of the 9/11 attack, Bin Laden's longer term hope is that the Muslims will be rallied against the Western World.

Second, reaction and public opinion necessarily overlap. The public demands blood. You could say cynically that governments are in place not to save the country but to win the next election.

Third, the whole issue of "asymmetric war" that receives a lot of attention now especially in US official and some academic circles. That is, one of restrictions on certain governments - the more democratic governments. They have to or they are expected to keep to the laws of war but the weaker side does not. Lately, we've heard about the question of prisoner of war status. I think we are going to see some changes to international law because there do seem to be grey areas and I know the International Red Cross for instance has been quite critical of the US stance regarding the fact that they don't accord the status in Iraq especially but their argument is that those combatants don't keep to the laws of war.

The other thing that the weaker side has to its advantage is that they have time on their side. Governments don't have time because as they start to lose soldiers, they start to lose support. The support in the US according to the latest polls for the war in Iraq is very low. One poll said 34% support the war. So the whole asymmetric game is not an easy game from a strategic point of view.

What is the latest Bin Laden claim, if it is authentic? They are claiming that the Israeli partial withdrawal from the Gaza strip is a result of Al-Qaeda's actions. The war is largely a psychological war. It doesn't help to win the military war or and even the political war if you lose the psychological war.

South African government statements seem to lay out a commitment to combat terror. Obviously, South Africa has some reservations about the global war on terror and it certainly doesn't seem to support the current situation in Iraq. It does have obvious sympathies for the

Palestinian cause and there is still this hangover concept from the past extending sympathy to national liberation movements generally.

Liberation movements open up a Pandora's box. Most so-called national liberation movements in the past and currently have intentionally or not included acts of terror. In the UN resolutions, up to about 2000 they still spoke about the national liberation movements. They don't do it anymore. All that they say is that no terror is justifiable whatever the motive. It doesn't matter what the motive is.

The question of law raises concerns in this country about upcoming terrorism legislation.² COSATU (South Africa's largest labor federation) was even concerned that certain labor action could be seen as terror. The act is very broad and raises concern about some liberties. While the detention clauses are somewhat more in line with constitutional obligations, the Act doesn't, for instance, require an overall political objective; that in my view is fatal because if you don't have an overall political objective that could be linked with religious objectives or ethnic or separatist objective, the crime must be considered merely a criminal act. If you don't have the political characteristics, where does terror end?

We also have the same problem with the dividing line between political violence and terror. In our rural areas now, the dissatisfaction with local service delivery has boiled over, leading to violence, attacks and arson. Is that now political violence or terror? Perhaps such things warrant a charge of murder under the ordinary criminal laws.

In South Africa, we don't have coordination yet to the extent that the US has. There is a plan to establish a national counter terror center but at the moment it is quite fragmented. The police revived their counter terror efforts after the arrests in the Boeremag case which is now still in court. Unfortunately, a lot of the knowledge has gone lost. I think South Africa thought that after 1994 there wasn't ever going to be terror again. Well that is a bit of wishful thinking. One must never be too absolute about things. In national intelligence, they have a desk that does some research on terror and intelligence gathering, but there is no co-ordinated effort yet.

South Africa is, of course, less of an international terror target than the US. About a year ago, the South African Commissioner for Police said that there was evidence that Al-Qaeda was going to disrupt the South African elections. I was asked for comment and I said I can see no reason why Al-Qaeda would want to harm a South African official interest. After all, the South Africa government is supportive of the Palestinian cause and against the war in Iraq.

Keep in mind, though, that South Africa does host a number of large global events. The world conference on sustainable development, the soccer world cup in 2010 make ideal targets and also of course Al-Qaeda has declared it is going to hunt down Americans everywhere in the world. We have already had Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Make no mistake, when you harden one target they go for another.

Unlike the US, we have very poor border control in some cases non-existent and also the port of entry control in Africa in general is not very good. So obviously this again creates opportunities. In the US, the Arabs initially had flight training and certainly our border control is not in a very good condition. We also have a lot of illegal firearms going around also being smuggled in.

Now let's look at causes. I would argue that there is much more revolutionary potential in South Africa than domestically in the US. National intelligence is being appointed to investigate whether there are any people actually inciting this kind of action. Now of course government don't easily acknowledge their failures, but we must also think of things like corruption and government inefficiency both on local level and corruption at the

² South Africa's Anti-terrorism Bill.

higher levels. Although the national intelligence still clings to this theory, I think the view that that poverty may be the main cause of terror is totally wrong. Poverty is not the main source of crime these days. People steal three and four million; not petty cash. You don't rape people because you are hungry. What you can argue is that poverty could be a backdrop but you need more. Frustration, corrupt government, insufficient government, all of these exist - not exclusively in South Africa, of course,

We don't have much religious schism in South Africa. We know that PAGAD was initially largely Muslim but Muslims comprise only about 2% of the South African population, and are mostly centered in the Western Cape. Their terror activities were not revolutionary; according to them they stemmed from frustration that the police was not doing enough to combat crime. It was only toward the end that they started targeting police stations and later on they spoke about the Muslim revolution but I think that was just an add on. Initially it was the inefficiency of the police and the drug trade that they were opposed too.

The Boeremag were incensed about affirmative action, farm murders, the inability of the government to combat crime in general. The point is from a subjective and certainly in some cases from an objective point of view crime is way above acceptable norms. But were these acts or revolution? About two, three years ago, some people burned down the whole facade of Pretoria station. I believed then that a revolution doesn't start with one piece of arson. You need leaders, you need organization. Of course, these things can follow so we should also look at things like corruption and inefficient government.

My last point is that South Africa, unlike the US, does obviously have some favorable bias towards countries like Cuba and Iran. We just abstained from the latest vote on Iran's use of nuclear power in the UN and obviously the US still sees both of these countries inter alia as state sponsors of international terror.

Curiously, we had an anthrax scare here similar to that time of the anthrax scare in the US but unlike in the US nobody died. Quite a number of cases were followed up - more than a hundred - and you know what not in one case was it genuine anthrax. It was baby powder and mielie meal and but not one case of anthrax. This is the other lesson that we should learn; terror is not always there necessarily to achieve a specific objective at all times. Chaos and disruption are often enough for the terrorist.

Question and answer session, part two

QUESTION: Professor Hough, South Africa has both the National Intelligence Agency as well as the South African Secret Organization working on terrorism. How many agencies in the US are working on it?

PROF HOUGH: The CIA is of course not basically a counter terror agency. The US also now has a national counter terrorism center, the Office of Homeland Security. The FBI is to some extent involved also and even the military. But I think what they've done now is try to establish one coordinating agency especially because of the extreme lack of intelligence coordination at 9/11. I think that is quite right. You must have one coordinating agency. We could probably argue that NICOC in South Africa should become that single agency. NICOC is at the moment our coordinating body for intelligence. But it is not an executive department and as far as intelligence regarding terror goes, that comes from the police or military or national intelligence or the secret service should actually be channelled to NICOC and the more important intelligence should then be channelled from them to the cabinet. But what is lacking is a "lead department."

The Senate commissions of inquiry into 9/11 pointed out that in the case of 9/11 nobody had total technical intelligence; they only had bits and pieces of strategic warning. The question is if those bits were thrown together would you have had actionable tactical

intelligence? That means the three T's: the type of attack, the target of the attack and the timing of the attack.

QUESTION: Professor Lutz, how do you go about restoring the credibility of one of the most well-known and most powerful international organization such as the UN after the invasion of Iraq?

PROF LUTZ: I think the most obvious immediate answer is that it is a process that will take place over time. The UN's credibility and importance is built over time as well. Fortunately the UN has a long history of effective actions.

Keep in mind that there is public advantage in the US domestically to be gained by politicians who complain about the United Nations. They are playing on the worst perceptions; the most isolationist perceptions of Americans who don't realize that the United States is part of the world whether we like it or not. There are politicians who make political advantage about being against the UN; that we shouldn't be paying and we should never put UN troops under UN authority or never let the UN tell us how to do things. That political dynamic works and is probably more debilitating to the United Nations in the long term than even the invasion in Iraq. But I think it is a long-term rebuilding process and I don't think the invasion of Iraq contrary to instead of permitting UN resolutions to continue has destroyed the organization. It is not that fragile.